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Abstract
Our social communications and the expression of our beliefs
and thoughts are becoming increasingly mediated and dif-
fused by online social media. Beyond countless other advan-
tages, this democratization and freedom of expression is also
entailing the transfer of unpleasant offline behaviors to the
online life, such as cyberbullying, sexting, hate speech and, in
general, any behavior not suitable for the online community
people belong to. To mitigate or even remove these threats
from their platforms, most of the social media providers are
implementing solutions for the automatic detection and fil-
tering of such inappropriate contents. However, the data they
use to train their tools are not publicly available.
In this context, we release a dataset gathered from Mastodon,
a distribute online social network which is formed by com-
munities that impose the rules of publication, and which al-
lows its users to mark their posts inappropriate if they per-
ceived them not suitable for the community they belong to.
The dataset consists of all the posts with public visibility pub-
lished by users hosted on servers which support the English
language. These data have been collected by implementing
an ad-hoc tool for downloading the public timelines of the
servers, namely instances, that form the Mastodon platform,
along with the meta-data associated to them. The overall cor-
pus contains over 5 million posts, spanning the entire life
of Mastodon. We associate to each post a label indicating
whether or not its content is inappropriate, as perceived by the
user who wrote it. Moreover, we also provide the full descrip-
tion of each instance. Finally, we present some basic statistics
about the production of inappropriate posts and the character-
istics of their associated textual content.
Introduction
In little over a decade, online social networks and social me-
dia have come over almost every aspect of the life of billion
people all over the world. Undoubtedly, all these social plat-
forms have facilitated the communications and broadly in-
creased the audience any sort of message can reach. In fact,
people have a large number of online communities available
to express, discuss and exchange any kind of information,
from their beliefs and views on various topics to artistic ex-
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pressions. Beyond countless other advantages, this democ-
ratization and freedom of expression (Gayo-Avello 2015) is
also entailing the transfer of unpleasant offline behaviors to
the online life. It is becoming increasingly clear that these
platforms open space for contents and conversations which
often become inappropriate and hurtful towards the online
communities that these systems are supporting. This nega-
tive phenomenon is further supported by a recent statement
by the Facebook VP of product management saying that the
Facebook community “submit tens of millions of reports a
week about potentially objectionable contents”1; and it is be-
coming more urgent since children and adolescents easily
access to social media but they are more susceptible to these
contents and more exposed to threats such as cyberbullying
(Dinakar, Reichart, and Lieberman 2011), online harassment
or sexting (O’Keeffe, Clarke-Pearson, and others 2011).
To defeat these threats, social media providers, first and
foremost Facebook, are developing AI systems for automat-
ically identifying inappropriate contents (Yenala et al. 2017)
on the basis of the large dataset of content moderation they
have. However, this kind of data are not publicly available
to the researchers’ community, which in the last years has
been very active in providing tools for the automatic iden-
tification of specific types of inappropriate contents such
as hate speech (Davidson et al. 2017; Vigna et al. 2017;
Ribeiro et al. 2017), sexually explicit texts (Jha and Mamidi
2017) or images, offensive language (Xiang et al. 2012) or
racism (Founta et al. 2018).
In this respect, we aim at providing the community with
a dataset that could help carrying on the research on this
topic. With this in mind, our attention has been directed to a
decentralized social network whose features are well suited
to the purpose: Mastodon, a new and fast emerging decen-
tralized microblogging platform. In particular, it exhibits the
following two services: i) that impose clearly stated rules of
publication and censorship which must be accepted by the
user who wants to register; and ii) it enables the user to pub-
lish an alert if she thinks that the post she is publishing may
be perceived as inappropriate by any reader. Thus, we re-
lease a dataset gathered from Mastodon consisting of two
1https://www.fastcompany.com/40566786/heres-how-
facebook-uses-ai-to-detect-many-kinds-of-bad-content
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elements: i) all the posts with public visibility published by
users hosted on Mastodon servers, namely instances, which
support the English language; and ii) the policy, the code of
conduct and the prohibited contents of each instance. Since
Mastodon comes with a built-in function which allows users
to mark their posts as “inappropriate” or “sensitive”, we as-
sociate to each item a label indicating its appropriateness.
Further, the definition of inappropriate – “Something that is
inappropriate is not useful or suitable for a particular situa-
tion or purpose.”2 – asks for a context in order to distinguish
what is suitable. In our case the context is provided by the
instance meta-data and we assume that users are aware of the
policy of the instance they belong to, as they choose it at the
registration time. The latter characteristics represent a nov-
elty and a change of paradigm in the today’s social media
ecosystem since they give the responsibility of publication
and of a possible censorship back to the users themselves.
Effectively, the dataset have been collected by implementing
an ad-hoc spider for retrieving the timelines of the instances
which form the Mastodon platform and their meta-data. The
overall corpus contains over 5M posts, spanning the entire
life of Mastodon. The DOI associated to the dataset, hosted
at https://dataverse.harvard.edu, is 10.7910/DVN/R1HKVS.
Dataset
Mastodon characteristics. Before delving into the details
about the released dataset and the methodology we used
to collect it, we briefly summarize what is Mastodon and
the features we exploit to get and label inappropriate con-
tents. Mastodon is a decentralized online social network
with microblogging features, where each server runs open
source software. The main aim of the project, which dates to
2016, is to restore control of the content distribution chan-
nels to the people by avoiding the insertion of sponsored
users or posts in the feeds. Due to its decentralized archi-
tecture, Mastodon is oriented towards small/medium com-
munities, called instances, which explicitly specify the top-
ics their users should be interested in. To this aim, each
instance declares the contents which are not allowed and
the spirit of the community it supports through a full de-
scription and a list of allowed topics. All these pieces of
information are available at the registration time, so that
users are aware of the instance policy and whether or not
a content is inappropriate for a given community. In fact,
the community-orientation strongly impacts the moderation
procedures. For instance, one of the most popular European
instances, “mastodon.social”, bans contents that are illegal
in Germany or France, including Nazi symbolism and Holo-
caust denial. That according to the idea of the Mastodon’s
founder, i.e. small and close communities would defeat un-
wanted behavior more effectively than a centralized solution
based on an operation team screening controversial contents.
Even though Mastodon is built around the concept of in-
stance, users belonging to a specific instance can communi-
cate with users on other instances, as well. In fact, as ev-
ery microblogging platform, the most basic way to inter-
2https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/
inappropriate
Figure 1: The box to compose a toot with a content warning.
act in Mastodon is the creation of a textual content, also
called ”toot”. A toot, or post, cannot exceed the 500 char-
acter length. Each toot has a privacy option, and users can
choose whether the post is public or private (Salve, Mori,
and Ricci 2018). Public messages can be aggregated and dis-
played on the federated timeline – a real-time wall which
collects the public contents coming from all the Mastodon
instances –, while private messages are shared on the time-
lines of the user’s followers only. A third timeline, namely
the local timeline, shows messages from users hosted on a
singular instance only. It is to note that Mastodon only al-
lows a chronological ordering of the timelines, thus avoid-
ing any ranking mechanism based on advertisement or other
recommendation algorithms. Finally, for the purpose of this
paper, we describe a further feature regarding the publication
of toots. When a user wants to post something that should
not be immediately visible or that may potentially result in-
appropriate for the community, she can “hide” it behind a
content warning, as shown in Figure 1.
By clicking on the “CW” button, a user can enter a short
summary of what the ”body” of her post contains, namely a
spoiler-text, and the full content of her toot. Automatically,
the system marks this toot as “sensitive” and only shows the
spoiler-text in all the timelines. We exploit this latter feature
to build our released dataset. This way the toots are labelled
by the users, and we assume that they are aware of the policy
of the instance and aware of what is appropriate or not for
their community.
Collection Methodology Here we describe the collection
methodology of the two main elements of our dataset: i) the
instance meta-data and ii) the local timelines of all the in-
stances which allow toots written in English.
The collection of the instance meta-data has become
a straightforward process since Mastodon developers in-
troduced an API to query different kinds of information
about the instances. In fact, although they are based on a
registration procedure where instance administrators have
to subscribe to them for being inserted into the query
results, APIs provide a lot of information about the in-
stances. Specifically, we are interested in the full descrip-
tion of each instance and the list of the allowed topics.
From our viewpoint, these two fields contain the informa-
tion related to the context which makes a post inappropri-
ate or not. We query these data through the API endpoint
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Figure 2: An example of toot in JSON format.
instances.social/api/1.0/instances/list
?count=0, which returns an array of JSON objects provid-
ing the data about the instances matching our criteria. In fact,
we apply a filter to retrieve all the instances which include
English as language for writing posts. In total, we release
information about 363 instances.
As for the retrieval of the local timelines we developed an
ad-hoc spider through the Scrapy framework 3. The spider
exploits the instance list obtained from the previous step and
makes a pool of requests to the instance endpoint4 which
returns the latest toots of the local timeline. Since the time-
lines implement a pagination mechanism, the spider extracts
the URL for the next request and repeat this procedure till
it reaches the end of the timeline. As in the case of instance
meta-data, each toot is represented by a JSON object which
contains information about both the post and the user who
wrote it. In the case of toots, we collected 5,877,355 items.
Data format and pre-processing Since both toots and
instance meta-data are formatted according to the JSON
specification we do not need to perform a strong data pre-
processing to make the elements of our dataset compliant to
the FAIR data principles (Wilkinson et al. 2016). In fact, the
JSON format guarantees i) a high interoperability, since it
can be processed with great ease by many different tools dur-
ing data analysis; ii) the findability, as we associate to each
object in the dataset a unique identifier; and iii) the acces-
sibility, since we provide a meta-data descriptor available in
JSON format. The meta-data file contains a brief description
of the fields we did not discard from the original represen-
tation provided by the Mastodon API, or that we introduced
to speed up further data analysis. For instance, as for toots,
we created the fields “created at date” and “tag list”. The
former refers to a Date object built from the string date con-
tained in the field “created at”, and the latter is created from
the field “tags”, i.e. it is an array of tags. We also added the
field “instance” which contains the name of the instance –
the hostname – from which the toot has been sent. Finally,
3https://scrapy.org/
4http://<instance>/api/v1/timelines/public?local=true
each toot provides the fields related to the inappropriate-
ness of its content, namely the entries “sensitive”, “content”,
“spoiler-text” and “language”. The boolean field “’sensitive”
indicates whether or not the author of the toot thinks that the
content is appropriate. If the toot is inappropriate, the field
is set up to “True” and the field “spoiler-text” would con-
tain a brief and publicly available description of the content.
The field “language” contains the language used to write the
toot, while the “content” contains the complete text, includ-
ing HTML tags. In Figure 2 we report an example of toot in
JSON format.
As for the instance meta-data, we only kept the information
which provides a context of the instance and the commu-
nity it supports. In Figure 3 we show an example of instance
meta-data. All the remaining fields of the original JSON re-
sponse have been discarded.
Figure 3: An example of instance meta-data in JSON format.
Ethical Considerations Through the above methodology
we are able to collect a large amount of data containing dif-
ferent kinds of content produced by individuals from around
the world. This fact rises some considerations about the pri-
vacy of the Mastodon users, that must be taken into account.
In particular, the JSON response about a toot contains plenty
of information about the user who has published the post.
Since the Mastodon user may be unaware of their data be-
ing public and reusable for research purposes we disposed
of the information about the users and we fully anonymized
them by hashing the Mastodon user identifier. This latter as-
pect might limit the reuse and the fusion of this dataset with
the topology of the Mastodon social network. To overcome
these limitations and to integrate our dataset with the dataset
about the Mastodon social network we previously released,
we re-hashed the node/user identifier in the latter dataset, so
that the same individual in both datasets corresponds to the
same hash code.
A final remark concerns the diversity of the contents pub-
lished in the Mastodon instances. Since each instance de-
fines its policy and a code of conduct of its members, it is
worth noting that pornography or contents for an adult au-
dience may not be prohibited in some instances. This might
hurt the feelings of some researchers who wish to avoid adult
contents.
Legal considerations Even though the distributed nature
of Mastodon allows each instance adopts a specific terms of
use and service, many instance are used to adopt the stan-
dard terms of service and privacy policy provided by the
Mastodon developers.5. In the terms of service and privacy
5https://mastodon.social/terms
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policy the gathering and the usage of public available data
is never explicitly mentioned, consequently our data collec-
tion seems to be complaint with the policy of the instance.
Moreover if the server of an instance is in the EU or the
EEA we also fulfill the requirements of the GDPR since we
do not store and release personally identifiable information
of the users. Finally, we have also respected the limitations
imposed by the robots.txt files of the different instances.
Inappropriate contents: producers and
properties of the text
In this section we provide some descriptive statistics about
the dataset in order to offer an overview on how inappropri-
ate contents are produced in the Mastodon network and to
what extent the practice of labelling toots is spread among
the Mastodon users. Moreover, we present a brief compar-
ison between inappropriate and “appropriate” textual con-
tents and a characterization of the field “spoiler-text”.
Content production We start our analysis from the pro-
duction of contents. In particular, in Table 1 we report the
list of the instances that cover up to 70% of the total num-
ber of collected toots, ordered by number of toots. It is ev-
ident how the production of toots is unevenly distributed
across the different instances, indeed a remarkable percent-
age of toots, around 39.5%, has been published in the in-
stance “mastodon.social”. This instance is one of the largest
instance of Mastodon6, it is not focused on any particular
topic and most of its toots are in English.
Instance name Number
of toots
Percentage
mastodon.social 2,323,827 39.53%
switter.at 493,245 8.39%
mamot.fr 398,691 6.78%
mastodon.at 267,500 6,78%
niu.moe 212,093 3.60%
octodon.social 170,070 2.89%
social.tchncs.de 91,559 1.55%
mastodon.art 85,531 1.45%
todon.nl 73,580 1.25%
social.lescorpsdereve.space 73,289 1.24%
Table 1: Toots per instance. We report the number of toots
published in each instance and its percentage with respect to
the overall amount of posts.
As for the production of inappropriate contents, we com-
pute for each instance in Table 1 the fraction of toots la-
belled as inappropriate and the percentage of users who has
produced at least one inappropriate content. Then, to assess
whether or not super producers of bad contents exist, we
quantify how inappropriate toots are distributed within the
producers by using the Gini index. Gini index takes values
between 0 – perfect equality – and 1 – complete inequality,
all toots are produced by one super producer –, and provides
a measure of the inequality of the productivity of instance
6“mastodon.social” is the forth largest instance in Mastodon,
the top-3 instances are Japanese instances.
users in terms of inappropriate toots. The above measure-
ments have been reported in Table 2. From the results it
emerges that most of the inappropriate toots are produced
by a very small fraction of users, i.e. the highest percentage
is 1.40%, got by the instance “switter.at”. We also observe
that the production of inappropriate contents is unevenly dis-
tributed across the bad content producers. In fact, for all the
instances the Gini index is high, namely above 0.8, meaning
that most of the sensitive toots belong to a very few users.
This result confirms the presence of super producers of inap-
propriate contents. This specific type of user may correspond
to i) people who maliciously publish inappropriate contents
or ii) people aware of the content warning function and of
the instance policy, who mark their contents as inappropriate
when they think they may hurt the feelings of the instance
members. This latter aspect will be the subject of a further
investigation.
Instance name % sensitive % users Gini
mastodon.social 5.42% 0.35% 0.825
switter.at 19% 1.40% 0.859
mamot.fr 0.6% 0.08% 0.858
mastodon.at 0.5% 0.03% 0.858
niu.moe 3% 0.22% 0.856
octodon.social 10.3% 0.36% 0.855
social.tchncs.de 10% 0.23% 0.857
mastodon.art 6% 0.86% 0.856
todon.nl 10.4% 0.25% 0.857
social.lescorpsde
reve.space
0.002% 0.003% 0.857
Table 2: Production of inappropriate contents. Percentage
of inappropriate toots and users who produce inappropriate
toots, and the Gini index.
Since Mastodon allows users to enrich their toots with
URL referring external pages and pictures, the identifica-
tion of which content is inappropriate is not straightforward.
To this aim, we limit our analysis to textual contents only.
Specifically, we filter out all toots which contain URL and/or
picture: in fact, if a toot contains a picture, the sensitive in-
formation is the picture itself, whereas if an URL is included
in a toot, it means that the sensitive information could be in
the referred content and not in the text of the toot. More-
over, contents referred by URL can be heterogeneous, e.g.
web pages, videos, pictures, etc., and require ad-hoc solu-
tions to be collected and labelled as inappropriate or not;
a task which is out of the scope of this work. Finally, we
discard all toots whose language is not English. By apply-
ing these filters we obtain 2,313,981 toots of which 206,486
(8.9%) are labelled as “sensitive”. In Table 3 we report the
list of the instances that cover up to 70% of the total number
of the filtered toots, ordered by number of textual toots. We
note that six instances, instead of ten, are enough to cover the
70% of the toots. In fact, more that 50% of filtered toots be-
long to the instance “mastodon.social”. Finally, we surpris-
ingly note that in the second instance, namely “switter.at”
– an instance accepting pornography – only text posts are
more frequent than expected as images or video are usually
642
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Length of contents. In (a) the distribution of the number of characters per toot measured on all the toots (green),
inappropriate toots (blue) and unlabelled toots (red). In (b) the distribution of the number of characters for the field “’spoiler-
text’.
predominant in adult contents.
Instance name Number of toots Percentage
mastodon.social 1,162,746 50.24%
switter.at 141,867 6.13%
niu.moe 135,080 5.83%
octodon.social 88,481 3.82%
knzk.me 53,830 2,32%
mst3k.interlinked.me 47,869 2.06%
Table 3: Toots per instances after filtering. We report the
number of toots published in each instance and its percent-
age with respect to the overall amount of posts.
Text content properties We report some basic properties
about the length of the text contents and brief overview of
the words exclusively used in inappropriate contents. As
for the first aspect, in Figure 4a we display the distribution
of the number of characters per toot (green line). The toot
length concentrates on values far from the maximum limit,
indeed the mean and median values equal to 129 and 82, re-
spectively. These statistics indicate that, generally speaking,
users do not take full advantage of all the expressivity of the
media, but use a much more concise style of communication,
as also happens in other platforms such as Twitter (Gligoric,
Anderson, and West 2018). But, it would be interesting to in-
vestigate whether it exists a dissimilarity in the communica-
tion style in terms of conciseness when user posts a inappro-
priate toot with respect to the publication of an “appropriate”
content. To this purpose, we divide the two types of toots,
then we compute the number of characters in the two pop-
ulations and their respective distributions, which are shown
in Figure 4a. The distribution of the number of characters
for the inappropriate toot class (blue line) is quite dissimilar
from the appropriate one (red line): the median value is equal
to 148 characters per toot, doubling up the 73 characters
per toot in the “appropriate” class. This result shows how
the style of communication changes according to the con-
tent you want to publish, becoming much more direct and
short in case you want to communicate “appropriate” con-
tents. Note that when a user decides to censor her own toot,
classifying it as inappropriate, she can add a brief descrip-
tion of the content in order to warn any audience sensitive
to that kind of content. This brief description, namely the
spoiler-text, does not have a maximum length, but deducts
characters available for the body of the toot. Spoiler texts are
usually very brief as they serve as a warning, while the con-
tent is embedded in the body of the toot available to willing
readers, only. This trait is confirmed by the distribution of
the spoiler-text length, shown in Figure 4b. Here, the prob-
ability of a spoiler-text having a length greater than 100 is
negligible (more precisely P (X > 100) = 0.0048), with a
median of 12.
Finally, we focus on the words which characterize the in-
appropriate text contents only. This analysis represents an
initial step helping researchers in the development of more
advanced techniques for the automatic identification of in-
appropriate contents in online social media. In fact, here we
limit to a word-level analysis to build a Bag-of-Words repre-
sentation. Specifically we adopt the following standard text-
mining methodology for text preparation:
• HTML tag removal: we use Beautiful Soup library7 to ex-
tract only the text part of the toot, removing any HTML
tag;
• tokenization: we split the text into tokens based on white
space and punctuation;
• normalization: we convert all the tokens to lowercase;
• stop-words removal: we use the stopwords module of
NLTK8 library to discard all tokens which represent stop-
words in English language;
• lemmatization: we use the WordNetLemmatizer module
of NLTK to bring back each word to its base or dictionary
form;
7Beautiful Soup: https://www.crummy.com/software/
BeautifulSoup/
8Natural Language Toolkit: https://www.nltk.org/
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(a) mastodon.social (b) octodon.social (c) switter.at
Figure 5: Words cloud of inappropriate toots in three of the main Mastodon instances.
• non-English words removal: we use the Detector module
of the polyglot9 library to filter out all words which are
different from English.
A set of words associated to each toot is the outcome of the
above pre-processing. Finally, we compute the set of words
which are exclusively present in the inappropriate toots. In
Figure 5 we visualize this set of words for three of the
major instances which produce inappropriate contents, i.e.
“mastodon.social”, “octodon.social” and “switter.at”. The
first instance is the main European general purpose instance,
the second one is focused on technological and geek stuffs,
whereas the third one is the place for sexual-related contents.
As expected, the sets of words characterizing inappropriate
contents are very different from one another. Specifically,
in mastodon.social inappropriate contents span a variety of
topics from sexual deviance to drugs, using slag words. In
octodon.social, sensitive contents fall into two categories:
(i) offensive and explicit sexual words, and (ii) spoilers of
TV series or movies. As for switter.at instance, inappropri-
ate posts cover the wide spectrum of adult contents. The
above findings highlight that the contents and the topics peo-
ple judge to be inappropriate depend on the community they
belong to, meaning that the perception of what may hurt peo-
ple’s feelings is influenced by the surrounding social con-
text.
Conclusion
Recently, given the latest scandals regarding the violation
of privacy and the widespread publication of inappropri-
ate contents in online social media, research on decentral-
ized social networks is experiencing a new and fast grow-
ing interest. In fact, decentralized social networks return to
individual users or groups of users not only their personal
data, but also the control over their contents. The under-
lying vision is to overcome the tradition paradigm that a
central authority decides what to censor, and to give the re-
sponsibility of publication and censorship back to the users
themselves. In this scenario, Mastodon represents the most
9Polyglot:https://polyglot.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
interesting decentralized social network currently on the
scene, as it is natively organized into communities that im-
pose the rules of publication and censorship. Not only that:
Mastodon allows the individual user to decide to publish
an alert if she thinks that the toot she is publishing may
be perceived as inappropriate by any reader. This feature
makes the dataset that we are releasing on the Mastodon’s
timelines a useful starting point to investigate what happens
when we return responsibility for publishing content to users
themselves. But above all, it allows us to investigate what
people judge to be inappropriate from a non-authoritative
viewpoint, taking into account the real perception of peo-
ple’s sensibility. Moreover, the current dataset can be eas-
ily integrated with its complementary counterpart, i.e. the
Mastodon social network, described in (Zignani, Gaito, and
Rossi 2018) and released at https://dataverse.mpi-sws.org/
dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5072/FK2/AMYZGS, to
investigate how phenomena as homophily or social pressure
act on the perception of the appropriateness of the published
contents.
The usage of this dataset empowers researchers to develop
new applications as well as to evaluate different machine
learning algorithms and methods on different tasks, e.g.:
• inappropriate text classification: the schema of the
dataset, i.e. each inappropriate content is labeled, facili-
tates the evaluation of new supervised learning algorithms
able to identify whether or not a content is inappropriate.
Moreover, since we showed that the semantic of many
words depends on the instances, we suppose that word
embeddings learnt on different instances may improve the
performance of the classifiers, being, at the same time, a
method to compare the behaviors of the different commu-
nities in Mastodon.
• automatic policy compliance: the perception of how
a content may hurt the people’s sensibility is person-
dependent, even in the case of a common code of con-
duct. So, the development of a tool which automatically
identifies whether or not a text content is compliant with
the policy of the instance, and consequently perceived as
inappropriate, might represent a useful extension to the
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functions of Mastodon.
• emoji and inappropriate contents: “emoji” have been
widely used to enhance the sentiment, emotion, and sar-
casm expressed in social media messages, so much that
they often play distinct social and communicative roles in
text contents. In many cases, the text contents we released
contain “emojis”, but a few is known about their semantic
and their usage when people express inappropriate con-
tents.
• users’ reactions to inappropriate contents: how do users
react to inappropriate contents? Do they reply with further
inappropriate contents or they are more tempered and try
to re-establish the original spirit of the code of conduct of
the community?
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